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Europeanisation of National Political Parties and Party 
System: Case Study of Montenegro
Olivera Komar and Zlatko Vujović
abstract: The process of European integration is at the very early stages in Mon-
tenegro. However, certain influences of this process on politics at the national level 
can be observed, including the building of a strong consensus on integration, which is 
partly due to the significant influence the European Union (EU) had in the organiza-
tion of the referendum on the state status of Montenegro in May 2006, as well as the 
special dynamic between political parties and citizens. These internal changes so far 
include changes in party rhetoric, mentioning the EU in party manifestos and declaring 
membership of it as a goal of political action. Other structural changes are less visible 
at the moment. Although the process of integration is at the very beginning, bearing in 
mind the period of time that has passed since the referendum (all other issues except 
the status of Montenegro as a state remained in the background until this issue was 
resolved), changes are happening rapidly, and one could argue that process of Europe-
anization of the party system might be faster in new EU accession countries.
Key words: political parties; party system; Europeanization; European integration 
Introduction
The stimulus for analysing the influence of the process of Europeanization on 
national parties in Montenegro came from theoretical assumptions made in a study 
conducted by a group of authors including Thomas Poguntke, Nicholas Aylott, Elisa-
beth Carter, Robert Ladrech and Kurt Richard Luther1  
This article accepts one of the possible meanings of the term “Europeanization” and 
sees it as the institutionalization of the European political system, which has certain 
effects on domestic structures and member states, and on concrete, intra-organizational 
change in national political parties, as a result of the ongoing process of European 
integration (Carter et al., 2007: 4–5). The study is especially concerned with the top-
down dimension of the Europeanization process, and the hypothesis underlying this 
research is that European integration has enhanced the intraparty power of two partially 
overlapping categories – EU specialists2 and party élites. 
1 The Europeanization of National Political Parties – Power and organizational adaptation, Routledge, 
London and New York, 2007.
2 In this study EU specialists are seen as a “heterogeneous group of actors who are characterized by the 
fact that a considerable part of their political activity is related to the process or substance of European 
governance” (Carter et al. 2007: 12). They include MEPs, members of national parliamentary EU affairs 
committees, EU spokespersons, etc. 
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Although inspired by this study, we realize that the model of research introduced 
in it is not fully applicable to Montenegro. First of all, it is not a part of the EU; it is 
in the very early accession stages and therefore: 1) its political parties do not have 
representatives in the European Parliament; 2) political parties’ representatives do not 
participate in the work of EU bodies that work on the basis of member state representa-
tion and; 3) Montenegrin EU specialists are not yet intensively participating in the 
work of EU institutions. In this sense the process of Europeanization is still at the very 
early beginning and has had very limited consequences in Montenegro. 
On the other hand, the first changes can be noticed. The negotiation process between 
Montenegro and the EU resulted in certain consequences due to which it is not possible 
to say that the process of Europeanization has had no influence on political parties in 
Montenegro. Some of these consequences included: 1) sections of the political élite 
are involved in the process of negotiations on accession to the EU because some of 
their work is for the Government and Council for European integration3; 2) some EU 
specialists, as members of the national parliament and EU specialists in parties, are 
involved in the process of association through: a) participation in government negotia-
tions with EU representatives; b) participation in the work of European Parliament 
political parties’ joint bodies; c) participation in the cooperation between the national 
and European Parliaments, including parliamentary delegations in the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe and the Partnership for Peace; (d) participation in the work of the National 
Parliamentary Board for European Integration. 
This is why this article is based on another semi-hypothesis made in the afore-
mentioned study, namely, that the authors of the study choose not to include in their 
comparison the new EU member states because they felt that their political parties did 
not have enough time to respond to the new environment (Carter et al., 2007: 17). On 
the other hand, the authors pose the question: was joining the EU in the post-Maas-
tricht period for the new EU countries an “external shock”, which was consequently 
followed by faster organizational adaptation? This article develops this question, and 
extends it to the countries that have yet to join the EU, including Montenegro. 
As we are limited by the fact that the article is an in-depth qualitative study of 
a single country, this question cannot be properly answered. It can, however, provide 
a thorough description of the early stages of the process and therefore contribute to fur-
ther research in this field; which could continuously monitor the process and provide 
more accurate “measurements”. This essay argues that the new accession countries 
are suffering from rapid changes due to the aforementioned “external shock”, which 
3 The (Montenegrin) Council for European integration was founded in April 2004 and its head is the 
President President of Montenegro. Its members include the President of the Government; the President 
of Parliament; the Vice-president of the Government for European integration; the Rector of the State 
University, President of the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, President of Constitutional 
Court and the President of the Supreme Court  One seat that is intended for an opposition party represen-
tative has still not been occupied. 
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makes them change and adapt rapidly. This would be especially true if, as in the case 
of Montenegro, the role of the European Union was extremely strong in one phase of 
a new EU member state’s development and provided a base for firm consensus among 
political parties about integration. 
At the beginning the article will provide brief a description of the party system 
in Montenegro, with a brief chronology of the main developments on the political 
scene since the multi-party system was reintroduced after the break up of Yugoslavia. 
Then, it will seek to explore the consensus on European integration, which exists in 
Montenegro among political parties and citizens, from three angles: its rationalization, 
manifestations and effects. In terms of rationalization, the article will look into the 
roots of EU rhetoric in the party scene in Montenegro and try to localize the main 
points of development, events that put the issue at the top of the political agenda, as 
well as events that accelerated this process. In this regard, the role of the EU in the 
main political events in Montenegrin society, including the recent referendum, will be 
explored. In the second part, the article will try to identify and present all manifesta-
tions of a positive attitude to the EU in the work of political parties, specific party 
decisions, party rhetoric, manifestos and policies, etc. This part of the article will also 
focus on effects of the presence of the EU in Montenegrin politics and the impact of its 
work, as well as internal changes in political parties as a result of greater integration 
into EU politics in terms of policy and structural changes. The third part of the article 
will look into the effects of this process and will try to measure the achieved effects of 
such attitudes in society and the party system. The main types of data to be used will be 
the results of the relevant public opinion polls, party manifestos and public statements 
of the representatives of political parties in Montenegro. 
Overview of development of post-communist party pluralism in 
Montenegro – Two Montenegrin transitions and one dominant party
The Montenegrin post-communist transition after the break-up of Yugoslavia 
comprised two basic phases. The beginning of the first was the “anti-bureaucracy 
revolution”4, which started in January 1989. During this “revolution” the former 
communist governing élite was deprived of power. A curious feature of the first 
Montenegrin transition was the fact that the main clash happened inside the govern-
ing Communist Party élite, and the main goal was not to change the system but the 
leadership structure. The leaders of the revolution were all members of The Alliance 
of Communists of Montenegro and held high positions. Srđan Darmanović (2007: 84) 
describes first Montenegrin transition in his article Long transition in Montenegro 
– from Semi-competitive Elections to Electoral Democracy as comparable to Romania, 
because a new political élite emerged from the old system, from the previous centre 
4 Popularly called the “Anti-bureaucracy revolution” revolution, this change of the rulling élite within the 
governing Alliance of Communists of Montenegro took place in January 1989 as a result of a number of 
riots caused by the economic and political crisis in the country. 
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of power. Thus, the Democratic Party of Socialists was created from the former Alli-
ance of Communists of Montenegro and continued to dominate the political scene in 
Montenegro for at least the first 16 years of party pluralism. 
After the “Anti-bureaucratic Revolution” Montenegro entered a period that 
Darmanović describes as a hybrid semi-authoritarian régime, led by one overwhelm-
ing authoritarian party – the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its “oligarchic 
ruling élite” (Darmanović, 2007: 85). Since then voters in Montenegro have had an 
opportunity to choose their representatives eight times, and on all eight occasions they 
chose this party or its representatives. 
In this period free and fair elections were held, but the opposition never had a real 
opportunity to win. Thanks to its monopoly position, and moreover the fact that it 
was created as a “state party”, the DPS won all the elections, leaving the opposition 
helpless. There is no doubt that this party was winning the elections based on the will 
of the voters. However, this desire was a significant product of the DPS’s monopoly 
position, which was inherited from the ex-Communist party from which it emerged, 
acquiring mechanisms for controlling various aspects of the state system. 
The second Montenegrin transition started in a very similar way to the first: through 
conflict inside the ruling élite. This happened not long after the parliamentary elections in 
1996, when the DPS gained a significant victory again thanks to gerrymandering, among 
other things. The main opponent of the DPS was the united opposition led by the Liberal 
Alliance of Montenegro, a party which strongly supported the independence of Montene-
gro, and the People’s Party, which supported union with Serbia. This unusual coalition 
was formed with the main aim of winning elections and taking power from the existing 
ruling party. It undertook to put aside all other differences until this goal was achieved. 
Although this coalition represented one of the most important steps forward in 
creating a more tolerant society and an attempt to at least temporarily eliminate po-
larization in society concerning state and national issues, success was not achieved. 
Thanks to a sudden “reform” of electoral constituencies (one of the good examples of 
gerrymandering) just before the elections, as well as other mechanisms that were at the 
disposal of the DPS, this party once again managed to preserve power (the DPS won 
51.2 percent of votes, or/and 45 out of 71 seats in parliament). 
At that moment a relatively unexpected conflict emerged inside the ruling party, which 
split it into two almost equal parts. It surfaced within the highest oligarchic élite, and the 
DPS was divided into two new parties: the DPS, which had an anti-Milošević programme 
and was led by Milo Đukanović, who was prime minister at the time; and the Social 
People’s Party, which became a strong supporter of Milošević’s politics in Montenegro 
and was led by Momir Bulatović, who was until then President of the Republic. 
This conflict was followed by presidential elections, which were extremely im-
portant not because of the amount of power accumulated in the hands of the president 
of the republic (although elected by the people, the president had only ceremonial 
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powers and the real centre of power was the Government), but because of their strong 
symbolic meaning. For the first time the pro- and anti-Milošević camps clashed, with 
both having almost equal chances of victory. One thing should be emphasized here: 
the split of the ruling party was not a consequence of any ideological differences, but 
a direct consequence between the struggle for power and influence within the ruling 
party, and ideological differences were the field in which both sides would seek to 
establish their legitimacy. This “theme” would be repeated often in contemporary 
Montenegrin political history. 
Assessing that their chances win this time were not so good, the DPS concluded 
the Agreement on the Basic of Principles for Development of the Democratic Infra-
structure in Montenegro with the opposition parties, and this document enabled basic 
guarantees for free and fair elections, which were to be held from then on. In return, 
the opposition supported the DPS candidate Milo Đukanović, who won the elections, 
and therefore the SNP officially became the opposition. 
The second political transition in Montenegro is considered to have ended after the 
fall of Milošević in October 2000 (Darmanović, 2007: 87). From that moment until the 
referendum in May 2006, the two main “blocs” changed their field of clashed, although 
not the subjects and characteristics: instead of being for and against Milošević, they 
became for independence and for the union with Serbia  
Basic characteristics of party system in Montenegro from 10 until 2007 
It is generally acknowledged that the number of registered parties, and even the 
number of parties that actually have seats in parliament is not enough to accurately 
describe the type of party system in one state. Many scientists tried to find more precise 
ways to calculate an index that would make the data comparable. Here we chose to 
use two that can, in our opinion, quite accurately describe party system in Montenegro 
– the index developed by Markku Laakso and Taagepera Rein and the classification 
devised by Jean Blondel (Source: Liphart, 2003: 119). 
Table 1: Development of party system in Montenegro – Calculation of effective 
number of parties after elections
No. year of elections Number of partiesthat won mandates
Effective number
Of parties
1 1990 11 2 1
2 1992  4 2 8
3 1996  6 2 3
4 1998  7 3 1
5 2001  8 3 9
6 2002  9 3 9
7 2006 16 4 8
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Table 2: Classification of party systems based on numbers and relative size  
of political parties
Party system Hypothetical example of seat distribution
Effective number 
of political parties
Two party system 55-45 2 0
Two and half party system 45-40-15 2 6
Multiparty system with dominant party 45-20-15-10-10 3 5
Multiparty system without dominant party 25-25-25-15-10 4 5
Source: Liphart, 2003: 8
The first table shows how many parties entered the Montenegrin Parliament after 
each election, and column 4 shows the effective number of parties in specific terms. 
As can be seen, the total number of political parties varied from 11 at the beginning to 
four (the lowest number in 1992), and the latest number is 16. The latest figures show 
a fragmentation tendency in the Montenegrin Parliament, as can also be shown by the 
index of the effective number of political parties. 
At the very beginning of the multi-party system, in Montenegro in the early 1990s, 
many political parties entered parliament. This was the case partly because of a very large 
coalition inside the Alliance of Reform Strengths of Yugoslavia, which comprised six par-
ties, and the Democratic Coalition, which comprised three. The trend of building coalitions 
was more marked in the period after 1998 and reached its peak after the parliamentary 
elections in 2007, when 16 parties won seats in parliament through nine party lists. 
After the parliamentary elections in 2006 there were 16 parties represented in the 
Montenegrin Parliament. According to a calculation based on Laakso and Taagepera’s 
index, the effective number of political parties in Montenegro would be 4.8. The table 
shows that while number of political parties had fluctuated somewhat, their effective 
number continued to grow. However, the period until 2002 can be regarded without 
doubt as a multi-party system with a dominant party, according to Blondel’s typology. 
The description provided by Andrew Heywood (2004: 490) of the main characteris-
tics of a multi-party system with a dominant party through five main characteristics 
fits Montenegro quite well: 1) the urge to shift political attention from competition 
between parties into conflicts between factions within a dominant party; 2) internal 
struggles as a way of enabling discussion inside the system in which small parties are 
usually marginalized; 3) a long period of holding power which causes self-satisfaction, 
arrogance and corruption inside the dominant party; 4) weak and inefficient opposi-
tion; and 5) the weakening of a democratic spirit, which frightens voters away from 
any change and makes them stick to the ”naturally“ governing party.
The 2006 parliamentary elections brought change in the sense that the number of 
effective political parties increased to 4.8, which, apart from indicating fragmentation, 
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indicates a slight weakening of the dominant party, which can also be tracked by some 
qualitative indicators such as the blocking of some DPS decisions by the other coalition 
partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was almost unimaginable before. 
There is another point to be made – the engine that drove all the changes until 2006 
was in fact conflicts within the dominant party, which polarized society concerning 
two basic topics (one can argue that it is the same topic with two variations): 1) support 
for the régime of Slobodan Milosević (until 2000); and; 2) support for an independent 
Montenegro (from 2000 until 2006). 
The opposition tried to unite in order to change the government but was not suc-
cessful because it was weak and divided. An additional reason was the fact that voters 
were for more than a decade “blackmailed” by major issues that “only the main parties 
could solve”. There were, however, two interesting brief moments in the opposition’s 
strategy, when it managed to moved beyond the issues on the agenda set by the ruling 
party. The first was already described –formation of the coalition People’s Agreement 
(Narodna sloga) which united pro-independents and pro-unionists with one goal – to 
change the government and put the DPS out of power. This pattern was repeated again 
when the Movement for Changes5 avoided giving its opinion publicly on whether 
Montenegro should be independent; therefore giving it space to form a broad front in 
order to change the government after this issue was resolved by the referendum. 
Once the country’s status was decided by the referendum, Montenegrin voters were 
“liberated” from major issues, creating space for more realistic political debate, which 
included questions related to social and economic development. European integra-
tion also appeared on the political agenda; however, the question remained whether 
the public discourse about this issue among political parties could be called a debate 
at all. 
Europeanization of the party system in Montenegro – Is there truly 
a consensus on integration?
Democratization and Europeanization are strongly connected processes in Mon-
tenegro. In its current position, the European Union served and serves even now as 
a very effective “carrot” for all political subjects in the country. The urge for integra-
tion into the EU was very strong, before independence was gained, and there was and 
is a silent “consensus” among all political parties about this goal, although this was not 
the case in the 1990s  
Polarization is one of the basic characteristics of Montenegrin society in almost 
every aspect. The strong divisions that appeared in the 1990s, which implied different 
5 The Movement for Changes (Pokret za promjene) was established in 2005 from a non-governmen-
tal organization called Group for Changes, which worked with the goal of changing the dominant 
state status debate with social and economic related issues. 
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attitudes related to the war, became apparent in other subjects and issues that were 
being debated in that period. The question of war in the Former Socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia divided the public and political activists on the issue of cooperation 
between Montenegro and the European Union. For a long time the EU, together with 
other western countries, was an issue that did not enjoy good reputation among a clear 
majority of the political parties until 1997. 
At the same time as the Democratic Party of Socialists was breaking up (1997) 
and the Socialist People’s Party was being established, the process of formulating an 
official change of stance towards European values and EU politics began. The biggest 
challenge for certain political parties’ relationships with the EU was the period during 
the bombing of former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO. The bloc of parties 
that supported Milošević’s political stance towards the other republics of the former 
Yugoslavia significantly reorganized its politics. Although on the side of Milošević’s 
government (Serbian People’s Party and Socialists People’s Party), their stance should 
have had suggested confrontation with the EU; instead, these parties argued for Euro-
pean integration. 
The change of régime in Belgrade in 2000 changed attitudes of sections of political 
parties in Montenegro towards this question but also many other issues as well. Cer-
tain sectors of opposition parties with a pro-Serbian orientation changed their attitude 
towards the international community and looked for an ally in finding a solution for 
the state status of Montenegro. The section of the international community opposed to 
Montenegrin independence at that time supported unionist forces, which suddenly be-
came proponents of European integration. The fight for the support of the international 
community in the Montenegrin referendum pushed the unionist opposition towards 
the European Union, which was an interesting shift. Defeat in the referendum and the 
search for a new political identity forced some of the parties to move from merely 
saying declaring they would adopt European values to actually doing so. Modifications 
to the opposition political scene, the formation of a new strong opposition (Movement 
for Changes) as well as strong positioning with the coming of a new leader of the 
Socialist People’s Party, once an associate of Milošević, according to the platform 
of European integration, made the political scene when considering the same pretty 
homogeneous. 
Until the parliamentary elections in 2006, no political party in parliament declared 
itself against European integration in any way. The affirmation of these intentions was 
shown in the Declaration of the Parliament of Republic of Montenegro that was, based 
on the initiative of non-governmental organizations6 passed in parliament in 2005. At 
6 The Declaration on Accession to the EU was adopted within the regular session of Montenegrin 
Parliament on 8 June 2005. The Text of the Declaration was made on the initiative of European 
Movement in Montenegro as well as some other NGOs in Montenegro (Centre for Citizen Edu-
cation, Centre for the Development of NGOs, CEDEM, Group for Changes and The Monitoring 
Centre (CEMI).
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that time, the declaration, which was supported by all parliamentary parties, showed 
the readiness and resolution of parliament to do everything in its power to accelerate 
the process of joining Euro-Atlantic integration.
Parliament in Montenegro became very fragmented after the 2006 parliamentary 
elections; 16 parties entered it, and nine of them had only one representative, and we 
could argue that the support of some of the new parties in parliament for Euro-Atlantic 
integration is, at the very least, debatable. For example, through the pre-electoral coali-
tion named Serbian List, led by the Serbian People’s Party, two parties that had and 
are presumed to still have negative attitudes towards the EU entered parliament. The 
Serbian Radical Party of “Vojislav Seselj”, which is part of the Serbian Radical Party 
in Serbia, firmly opposes ideas of European integration, and argues for the concept of 
a single Serbian state in the Balkans. Other members of this coalition: the Serbian Peo-
ple’s Party; the Democratic Party of Unity; and the People’s Socialist Party, have very 
similar attitudes. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the Serbian People’s 
Party, as the strongest party in this coalition, has declared that it supports the successful 
finalization of the process of Montenegrin accession to the European Union, which is 
in a way proved by the programme it adopted after the establishment of Montenegrin 
independence  
The Declaration of independence and first elections results in the independent 
country raised the question of distinction between the European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The Liberal party, which followed the former and through its own deci-
sion disbanded Liberal Alliance of Montenegro, supported European, but was against 
NATO integration. One can also emphasize the fact that all five larger parties support 
European integration, and just a few parties with one representative all publicly or 
off the record opposed this process. If under the consensus we consider the support 
of the majority, which in this case could amount to over 90 percent of Montenegrin 
MPs, than we can conclude that there is a consensus in Montenegro. To what extent 
it corresponds to the true acceptance of values, and to what extent is motivated by 
political pragmatism in order to increase voter support is a separate question which 
will be considered in the section concerning the manifestations of consensus. 
Rationalization of EU rhetoric 
Now that we have determined that there is a basic consensus among the political 
parties about the inevitability of European integration, we will look more closely at 
the reasons behind this consensus in Montenegro. They can be divided into two main 
groups: 1) “common” reasons that are likely to be found in all countries joining the EU 
and: 2) reasons that are more specific for the Montenegrin context. Common reasons 
could include: 1) a generally high support among the population for EU integration; 
2) a process of integration that included all countries in the neighbourhood; and 3) the 
lack of information that citizens and political parties have about the level of change 
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that is expected in different structures of society. Reasons that are more specific to 
Montenegro include the context in which it gained its independence and in which 
the European Union, being a key important subject, became willingly and unwillingly 
a place where all political parties found common ground. 
Popular support for European integration as a reason  
for “consensus”
The third common subject which was used in the campaigns of all political parties 
(the first would be state status and the second related to the social and economical 
status of the country) was EU integration. All political parties in Montenegro sup-
ported the integration process in some form. However, in the pre-referendum period 
pro-independence parties believed that Montenegro could faster integrate as it was 
independent, and pro-union parties believed that the process would be faster with Ser-
bia. This was how the same goal was “used” in political debate, especially before the 
referendum, as a crucial argument for attracting voters on both sides. This campaign 
was again deployed during the 2006 parliamentary elections. Each political party 
argued that it offered a more secure and faster road to the EU. Therefore voters were 
offered basically the same goal – integration into the EU, and the only difference was 
that the roads leading to integration differed according to each of the political parties, 
as seen in their campaigns and although this is debatable. This contributed to the public 
support for the process and vice versa overwhelming public support generated through 
campaign encouraged and strengthened the consensus among political parties to be in 
favour of the process. This was a very good tactic regarding public opinion that exists 
in Montenegro about this issue. The 2006 and 2007 public opinion researches showed 
exact figures (CEDEM7). 
Table 3: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 and 2007 conducted by CEDEM 
on question whether Montenegro should enter EU
Whether Montenegro should join EU?
200 2007
yes 76,5 % 74   %
No  5,6 %  8,4 %
Doesn’t know 17,9 % 17,6 %
Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007
7 The Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) is a Montenegrin non-governmental organiza-
tion which periodically conducts public opinion research in the field of politics. It has enjoyed success 
in its work. 
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Table 4: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 cross tabulated with information 
about party affiliation conducted by CEDEM
Whether Montenegro should join EU? CEDEM 200 
Party affiliation DPS-SDP Liberal and Bosniaks party 
Movement  
for changes 
SNP- 
NS-DSS
Serbian  
list
Relation towards 
independence issue
Pro- 
independent
Pro- 
independent Neutral
Pro- 
unionist
Pro-
unionist
yes 92 4 % 95 9 77 2 62 57 8
No  1 8 % –  5 7 13 4 16 9
Doesn’t know  5 9 %  4 1 17 1 24 6 25 3
Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007
From the acquired data, we can see that one of the reasons that political parties support 
European integration can be found in the fact that a clear majority of people in Montenegro 
support it. From the information gathered in 2006, which is cross-tabulated with informa-
tion about party affiliation of voters, one can see that in the period before the referendum 
supporters of all political parties, regardless party of position on the issue of independ-
ence were in majority in favour of integration. This majority was larger when it comes 
to pro-independence voters. These figures slightly changed in 2007, and the number of 
people against integration increased. This trend is partly to be expected to continue, as in 
integration progresses. However, importantly, most people still support integration. There 
are several reasons for this, one of them being the desire to belong to modern and wealthy 
societies, and this is very often believed to be synonymous with EU membership.
The other reason could be the low level of understanding among people about what 
integration actually entails. We can offer one argument supporting this theory. It is 
related to the question of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Opinion polls conducted by CEDEM showed that a significant percentage of people do 
not understand that cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is one of the preconditions 
for European integration. 
Table 5: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 and 2007 conducted by CEDEM 
on question whether Montenegro should cooperate with The Hague Tribune
Whether there should be cooperation with The Hague Tribune?
200 2007
yes 50   % 45,3 %
No 27 4 % 32,6 %
Doesn’t know 21 7 % 22 1 %
Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007
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Table 6: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 cross tabulated with information 
about party affiliation conducted by CEDEM
Whether there should be cooperation with The Hague tribune? CEDEM 200 
Party affiliation DPS-SDP Liberal and  Bosnians party 
Movement  
for changes 
SNP- 
NS-DSS
Serbian  
list
Relation towards 
independence issue
Pro- 
independent
Pro- 
independent Neutral
Pro- 
unionist
Pro-
unionist
yes 78 7 % 83 7 % 42 3 % 17 % 10   %
No  4 7 % 10 2 % 27 6 % 66 % 72   %
Doesn’t know 16 6 %  6 1 % 30 1 % 17 % 16 5 %
Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007
Table 7: Results of public opinion poll in 2006 and 2007 conducted by CEDEM 
on question whether Montenegro should cooperate with The Hague Tribune
Whether Montenegro should join NaTO (CEDEM, 2007)?
yes 36,6%
No 34,6%
Doesn’t know 28,8%
Source: CEDEM, report August 2006 and February 2007
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from these figures. First of all, 
there is a lack of information and understanding of the integration processes among 
citizens, who do not understand that this issue is strongly connected to the integra-
tion process. Also, it is evident that this is the area in which politicians start to 
differentiate their policies. An example of this could be the referendum campaign, 
when pro-union parties used two arguments, which were in fact contradictory. On 
one side they supported EU integration and on the other they sought to mobilize 
voters through a campaign against supporting the Hague Tribunal. This strategy 
in fact worked quite well. In addition, as could be seen before, some political 
parties do not support accession to NATO. This could be also explained by the fact 
that the percentage of people supporting NATO integration is significantly lower 
than those supporting EU integration. Some political parties are searching for their 
identity in this field (see Table 7). 
The role of EU in organization of Referendum as a reason for “consensus”
The union of Montenegro and Serbia was established in 2002 by the “Belgrade 
Agreement” after which the Constitutional Treaty was signed. Article 60 of the Treaty 
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contained a provision that three years after signing The Belgrade Agreement member 
states can call for a referendum and reach a decision about their state status. In 2005 
the Agreement on the Amendment to the Treaty was signed, introducing a provision 
that a referendum should be held according to democratically recognized international 
standards which are in line with European Union. This provision opened the doors 
wide for EU intervention. This intervention, from today’s perspective, was very im-
portant and had an important role in the peaceful resolution of the Montenegrin state 
problem. However, that does not make it uncontroversial. 
The European Union, through the Council of Europe and The Venice Commission 
and negotiation process, set the rules for the referendum. What was at the beginning 
perceived as impossible actually happened. In the end, all the political parties except 
the Serbian National Party agreed to participate in the referendum, according to all 
the rules, which were partly set before the “game began”. They included some strange 
criteria, such as a 55-percent majority, a Slovak citizen appointed as the Head of the 
Republic Referendum Commission – a figure who had very important powers,8 etc  
There was a true consensus because no party had all its demands met and therefore 
nobody was completely satisfied, although they all agreed upon the rules at the end. 
There can be two main explanations of how political parties that refused to commu-
nicate at the beginning of the negotiation process agreed to these imposed rules. One 
was external and included strong pressure hinted at by EU bodies, and the second 
was internal and related to the perceived chances to win (for the first time, both sides 
actually had the chance to win; in fact pro-union bloc at the end lacked only 2000 votes 
for victory) which were priority to formal rules for political parties. In this sense they 
agreed to accept certain strange rules implied by EU in order to achieve their final goal 
– victory. Although the formal side of the process ended up the strongest legitimization 
pillar, at the beginning it was almost neglected from the side of political parties. 
Although at the time perceived as dangerous tactic (what would had happened 
if the result was in a “grey zone?”9), EU on behalf of international community was 
the factor that enabled swift movement forward for Montenegro by resolving one of 
the most important issues – state status. As a result, Montenegro became the unique 
example of a country resolving, through a peaceful ballot, such an important issue 
that divided society into two. From this perspective, the role of the European Union 
was crucial, and it brought the political parties in Montenegro closer to the process of 
Europeanization. 
8 One of the powers was the “golden vote”. Referendum commissions on all levels, including the Republic 
Referendum Commission, consisted of an equal number of members from both sides, and if the decisi-
on-making process was blocked decisions would be take at a higher level. The highest level was the 
Republic Referendum Commission, which was made up of eight members from each block. The Head 
of the Commission had a “golden vote” to actually decide if voting is blocked. 
9 The expression “grey zone” was used for description of possible result between 51 and 55 percent of people 
voting for independence, in which a very strange situation would occur: the pro-independence movement 
would win a majority of votes and yet lose the referendum. It was perceived that such a situation in which 
winners would be losers would lead to possible civil unrest and deepen conflict instead of being a solution. 
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Manifestations of consensus
In our attempt to identify different signs of party consensus related to EU integra-
tion we will look only at the parties that had more then two members in parliament 
after the 2006 elections. This means that we will consider the two governmental parties 
– the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
three opposition parties: the Movement for changes (PZP), Serbian National Party 
(SNS) and the Social National Party (SNP). 
The first positive results appeared from the efforts made by the political parties 
that supported Milošević in the past. They started to change as a result of Euro-inte-
gration; the best example would be the SNP. After failing to win in the referendum 
and a number of elections, this party started seeking a new political identity in the 
promotion of European values. Although at the beginning there was an impression that 
this stance was merely rhetoric, after the election of the new leader, the actions of the 
SNP became more and more trustworthy. The new leader was someone who had been 
in the past in charge of EU related issues in this party. A significant movement forward 
was made also in the educating the SNP’s members, who traditionally had a negative 
attitude towards Euro-Atlantic integration.
The second party in the unionist bloc, the SNS, which after referendum became 
the strongest Serbian party in Montenegro, did not move towards European issues. 
Although formally supporting European integration, as it claimed in its programme, its 
strong coalition relationship with Serbian radical parties and a number of controversial 
extremist attitudes so not speak in favour of any substantial change. In its programme 
the SNS states also that it is in favour of Euro-Atlantic integration if there is a general 
popular consensus on it. If not, a referendum should be called. It is interesting that 
in its programme the SNS states that it sees itself in future as a part of the European 
conservative family of parties, especially the European People’s Party.
The Movement for Changes dedicated part of its programme to European integra-
tion, although this party is strongly pro-European. The NGO (Group for Changes) 
from which this party emerged was one of the authors of Pro-European declaration of 
NGOs, which was adopted by the Montenegrin Parliament in 2005. The Programme 
of the Movement for Changes includes clear statements about its goal – integration to 
EU and draft of the strategy for European integration of Montenegro. 
The leading coalition (DPS-SDP), in its own programmes as well as a number of 
other statements, supports European integration and says there is no alternative. How-
ever, the comments of people close to the ruling coalition, who have a considerable 
amount of economic power and whose financial interests would be jeopardized in 
process of integration, started speaking in public against integration in a measured 
way. Because of their very strong influence on society and the ruling party these in-
formal centres of power could in future put obstacles in the way of EU integration in 
Montenegro. Conflicting interests surrounding privatization, and lobbying for interests 
of owners of capital outside the EU, which are interfering in the ruling coalition could 
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also have an influence on future integration. The linkage between party politics and 
the grey economy is very strong in Montenegro, especially in the incumbent parties. 
In the above description of the its party system it was said that in fact there has been 
one party in power in Montenegro since the multi-party system was introduced. Its 
clear majority and time in power over time resulted in its involvement in corruption 
and enabled the creation very powerful centres of informal economic power which are 
now strongly influencing political processes. 
The DPS clearly defines its goal – integration into the EU, without mentioning 
Euro-Atlantic integration specifically. In its programme the SDP states it believes that it 
is strategically important for Montenegro to be included in European integration proc-
esses and other integration important to for the country’s development. Also, the SDP 
argues for Montenegro’s inclusion in European and Euro-Atlantic military structures. 
The poor staffing of political parties as well as a high level of non-professionalism in 
dealing with many issues, as well as integration, are characteristic of the Montenegrin party 
system. Apart from a few examples, parties are not making significant efforts in the field 
of EU integration. The poor work inside parties can also be described by the fact that only 
one political party changed its programme after independence. EU integration is not even 
mentioned in several political parties’ programmes, although it is present in their rhetoric. 
The consensus between political parties about the Montenegrin goal of joining the EU 
does not mean that there are palpable elements of Europeanization of the party system in 
Montenegro yet. Most programmes of the political parties include a mention of the EU 
or Europe in different contexts, mostly as a vision or goal that should be realized.
In addition are no changes in the internal structure and organization of the political 
parties in Montenegro, which can be described as overwhelmingly oligarchic. In 2003 
a new law on political parties was passed, and one of its provisions introduced obliga-
tory elements of each party internal acts. A number of political parties that made any 
changes to their programmes can be neglected. Parties still strongly oppose women 
quotas in Parliament or free mandate for example which are all changes they will have 
to accept once the EU accession process accelerates. Two parties – SDP and PZP have 
introduced gender sensitive language in their internal acts. Not one political party has 
set up special bodies working only on EU issues. 
As for acting supranational, Montenegro has so far had delegations in Parliamentary 
Assemblies of Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly. These delegations are 
being chosen by a special Committee gathered around the President of the Parliament. 
According to the electoral results, standing members of the delegations include two 
members from Government (DPS and SDP) and one member of opposition, who is 
appointed by the opposition. These are the first steps towards participation in decision 
making at supranational level, and we cannot still see any significant shift of power in 
the members’ direction; moreover, the parties choose very important and high positioned 
members and because their power within Parliamentary Assemblies is low. 
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Table 8: Areas of political party Europeanization in Montenegro according  
to Mair (2000) and Ladrech (2002) 
aREaS OF POLITICaL
PaRTy 
EUROPEaNISaTION
Research findings in Montenegro
Political parties
Policy/programmatic 
content 
Very modest modification of programs can be observed. 
Traces of program support are clearly definded in 
Declaration about European integrations which was 
adopted in Montenegrin Parliament.
Organization No changes can be observed in this field. 
National party system
Format Marginal impact at the moment. 
One can expect that little political parties might look for 
legitimacy into radicalisation of EU and NATO accession 
in future and therefore form stronger front against it. 
Patterns of party 
competition /
mechanics of interactions 
between parties
 Topics related to EU integrations are only partly 
subject of true debate. This is the case only with NATO 
accession, which is indirectly connected to EU accession. 
Debate is superficial and mostly includes criticizing 
government of being too slow. 
As said before, little parties might seek for legitimacy in 
euro sceptic field in the future. At the moment this is only 
case with NATO accession.
Party-government relations Until recently there was no constructive relation 
considering European, as well as any other questions, 
between the Government and the opposition. The 
situation is slowly changing within the field of European 
integrations, after constructive positioning of two leading 
opposition parties  
Transnational
Relations beyond the 
national party system
Currently, the scene is witnessing the increase of the 
number of contacts with factors outside Montenegro 
related to this question. 
Although not numerous the existence of contacts with 
parties outside Montenegro is noticeable as well as 
cooperation expanding related to this question. 
Source: a synthesised view presented at Slovenian Political Science Conference and Central European 
Political Science Association in Portoroz, Slovenia, may 2007
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Concluding remarks 
No Eurosceptic party has been established in Montenegro yet among parties with 
strong voter support, and all parties have declared themselves to be pro-European Union. 
There is, however a difference among political parties when talking about accession to 
NATO. Most political parties support joining NATO, however, one is strongly against 
this kind of decision – the Liberal Party. Certain sections of the Serbian nationalist 
parties are also sceptical about NATO integration, but are not publicly against it. The 
People’s Party, one of the Serbian parties, has slowly become an opponent of NATO 
integration. It could be expected that fragmentation of the Parliament would influ-
ence radicalization of part of the political parties in their quest for identity. This could 
lead to the establishment of true Eurosceptic parties. In this article we analysed only 
political parties with more then one MP, however there are other nine parties with one 
MP which might take a negative attitude towards security and European integration. 
Some of them could become significantly stronger at the next elections, and this could 
especially be the case with the Serbian Radical Party which in 1992 had 9.4 percent 
representation in Parliament and whose central headquarters – the Serbian Radical 
Party in Serbia is having significant successes. Apart from getting stronger, this party 
might strongly influence the SNS, leader of the Serbian list and this could cause shift 
of this strong party regarding EU and Atlantic integration. 
The work of the small parties might sow seeds of Euroscepticism in Montenegro, 
since there are grounds for it in the light of the strong empathy of a part of the popula-
tion with Kosovo This issue may again become topical in the near future, bombing of 
Serbia and which can once again awake negative relation towards western values and 
integration. 
A significant part of the population supported the EU because the EU supported the 
union with Serbia. Now that the issue is off the agenda, their support might decrease. 
The other danger comes from some strong and influential informal economic centres 
of power close to ruling party, which are announcing their disagreement with fast 
integration to EU in order to protect their existing financial monopolies. 
Apart of the above stated, a significant number of political subjects believe that 
accession to EU will not happen in the near future so that they are not putting any effort 
into better informing themselves about this process. Thus, their statements about this 
issue are more a signal of political inertia than a manifestation of concrete interest. 
If the results of CEDEM’s research before the referenda in 2006 and 2007 are 
compared, a slight trend of decrease in support for Montenegro’s membership of the 
EU can be seen. Support fell from 76.5 percent to 74 percent, and the number of those 
opponents increased from 5.6 percent to 8.4 percent, while the number of those with 
no opinion on the matter remained more or less unchanged, at 17.9 percent in 2006 and 
17.6 percent in 2007. It could be expected that this trend will continue but that it will 
not jeopardize the accession process. As Montenegro approaches accession, the level 
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of information among citizens will increase and this will affect party rhetoric, which 
will continue to adjust to public attitudes in the quest for voter support. This will be the 
most visible in the opposition parties. 
The process of stronger Europeanization of the political parties’ system could 
become stronger once Montenegro becomes a candidate country. When this happens 
it will be able to send a delegation to European Parliament with observer status, and 
this possibility might open the door to stronger influence of European party system on 
Montenegrin parties. The expected consequences are as follows: 1) more clear ideo-
logical profiles; 2) ideologically close parties working together more closely; 3) better 
understanding of work of European institutions; 4) improvement of the work of party 
administrations; 5) improvement of the work of members of parliament and their clubs 
in parliaments; and 6) connecting and receiving support for improving party resources 
from partners outside Montenegro.
The integration of political parties at the European level would more strongly af-
fect the Europeanization of the Montenegrin party system. Moreover, in this regard, 
we must not neglect the possible influence of Eurosceptic MPs from the European 
Parliament. 
As a final conclusion one can expect clearer positioning of political parties regard-
ing the question of European integration, which will be accelerated in the future, when 
Montenegro gains EU membership status. This will be followed with better informa-
tion, closer contacts and an understanding of what membership of the EU really means. 
This might in the future more strongly influence their internal structures. 
Such a process might also lead to a clearer definition of supporters and opponents 
of European integration between political parties and might also reflect in general 
Montenegrin public and these two processes might mutually affect each other. One 
could expect that this might weaken support for integration in time in relation to cur-
rent statistics; however this might not jeopardize the process in general. 
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